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The definition of the concept of ‘place of safety’ (or the lack thereof) This is problematic: the fate of people currently fleeing from Libya – and the outcome of the proceedings against Proactiva Open Arms – depend on its definition, as next section shows. Notably, there is no agreed definition of what a ‘place of safety’ is. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS) and the SAR convention provide that states are also responsible for coordinating search and rescue operations.Īccording to the SAR, a state is not relieved from its obligation to guarantee the rescue of people in danger at sea until they are delivered to a ‘place of safety’. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), a state shall require the master of a ship flying its flag to ‘render assistance to any person found at sea in danger’ (Article 98). In the 20 thcentury, this custom duty was codified into international treaties, making states responsible for safety at sea. To safeguard people’s lives, an ancient custom imposes a duty on seafarers worldwide to assist people in danger at sea. As soon as people began sailing seas and crossing oceans, they started dealing with the dangers which lie therein. The Law of the Sea and the obligation to rescue people in danger

The decision by the judge in Ragusa interprets ‘place of safety’ in accordance with the human rights of migrants, and rightly overcomes inappropriate distinctions based on migrants’ statuses. of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979, “SAR Convention”). International law merely states that people rescued at sea shall be delivered to a ‘place of safety’, but provides no definition of it ( 3.1.9. This post argues that the order issued on 16 April is an important step forward in the definition of the notion of ‘place of safety’. the intersection between the Law of the Sea and the human rights of migrants.

Secondly, the decision, despite being just a pre-trial order, offers interesting insights into a contested area of international law which is gaining increase salience, i.e. It obliquely tackles the legitimacy of the ‘pull-back’ agreement between Italy and Libya, as part of which the two states agree to collaborate with the aim of returning migrants to Libya, and which was recently challenged before the European Court of Human Rights (see this previous EJIL:Talk! post). This post examines the decision issued on 16 April 2018 by the pre-trial judge of Ragusa (Sicily) that ordered the release of the Open Arms vessel. One of the most recent cases regards the NGO Proactiva Open Arms: it has been accused of smuggling migrants during rescue operations at sea, and its rescue ship was impounded by the Italian authorities. The work of the NGOs rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean Sea has been the subject of much controversy.